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B
ackground to the debate: A variety of biomedical 
technologies are being developed that can be used for 
purposes other than treating disease. Such “enhancement 
technologies” can be used to improve our appearance and 
regulate our emotions, with the goal of feeling “better than 
well.” While these technologies can help people adapt to 
their rapidly changing lifestyles, their use raises important 
ethical issues.
Arthur Caplan’s Viewpoint: Nobody Is Perfect—
But Why Not Try to Be Better?
Perfection has come in for a lot of bad press recently. 
A torrent of books and articles has recently appeared 
[1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9], all raising serious ethical questions 
about the wisdom and morality of trying to use biomedical 
knowledge to perfect ourselves or our offspring. 
Biomedical scientists and physicians might be inclined to 
ignore this literature as just so much abstract philosophical 
handwringing. After all, it is almost impossible to ﬁ  nd 
mainstream scientists arrogant enough to proclaim their 
interest in perfecting anything, much less themselves or their 
fellow human beings. 
Beating up on the pursuit of perfection is silly. As Salvadore 
Dali famously pointed out, “Have no fear of perfection—
you’ll never reach it.” Critics of those who allegedly seek to 
perfect human beings know this. While often couching their 
critiques in language that assails the pursuit of perfection, 
what they really are attacking is the far more oft-expressed—
albeit far less lofty—desire to improve or enhance a particular 
behavior or trait by the application of emerging biomedical 
knowledge in genetics, neuroscience, pharmacology, and 
physiology. Those who might accurately be termed “anti-
meliorists” wonder how we will ever resist the obvious 
temptation to put this knowledge to use to alter ourselves. 
They are quick to note that we have already given in to such 
temptation—we augment our breasts, smooth our wrinkles,   
and pump ourselves full of antidepressants. 
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Putting the brakes on biologically driven human 
betterment would have real consequences for science. Some 
lines of research would be slowed or restricted [3,5,8]. Their 
application would be declared off-limits or at least tightly 
regulated [1,2,3,4,5,7,8,9]. 
Why is the drive to improve ourselves so disturbing to 
the anti-meliorists? Their arguments cluster around three 
key worries: that the pursuit of perfection by biomedical 
means is vain, selﬁ  sh, and unrewarding [1,2,3,6,7], that 
improving ourselves is unfair [1,3,4], and that enhancement 
or improvement violates human nature [2,4,5,7,8,9] and may 
actually destroy it [2,5,7,9]. It is the last of these arguments 
that is at the core of anti-meliorist concerns. 
It cannot simply be the pursuit of improvement that is 
making anti-meliorists nervous. Many religious traditions 
and spiritual movements seek perfection [10,11,12,13], but 
these evoke no negative commentary from the anti-meliorists. 
Nor do efforts to improve animals and plants set this crowd 
aﬂ  utter. Rather, it is biomedical knowledge being applied to 
you and me that is the crux of their concern. They fear that 
in applying new biomedical knowledge to improve human 
beings, something essential about humanity will be lost. If 
biomedical tinkering is allowed, we will destroy the very thing 
that makes us human—our nature.
Anti-meliorism rests, however, on a very shaky foundation. 
To support their position, the anti-meliorists must state what 
human nature is. They do not. They must also be very clear 
about why they see human nature as static. They are not. And 
they must advance an argument about why human nature, 
which has presumably evolved in response to an enormous 
array of random forces, tells us anything about what is good 
or desirable in terms of the traits humans should possess. 
They cannot.
The ﬁ  ght over whether there is any such thing as human 
nature is a long-standing one [14]. But one can concede that 
we are shaped by a causally powerful set of genetic inﬂ  uences 
and still remain skeptical as to whether these produce a single 
“nature” that all members of humanity possess. Is there a 
single trait or ﬁ  xed set of traits that deﬁ  nes the nature of who 
we are and have been throughout our entire existence on this 
planet? Unless they can articulate this Platonic essence, anti-
meliorists do not have a foundation for their argument that 
change, improvement, and betterment are grave threats to 
humanity.
Worse still for anti-meliorists, we are clearly creatures 
who have long tinkered with ourselves, using all manner of 
technologies from clothing to telescopes to computers to 
airplanes. Our view of our “nature” is closely linked to the 
technologies that we have invented and to which we have 
adapted [15]. We are already technological creatures.
Nor is there any normative guidance offered by our 
evolutionary history that shows why we should not try to 
improve upon the biological design with which we are 
endowed. Augmenting breasts or prolonging erections may 
be vain and even a waste of scarce resources, but seeking to 
use our knowledge to enhance our vision, memory, learning 
skills, immunity, or metabolism is not obviously either.
Ultimately, anti-meliorism posits a static vision of human 
nature to which the anti-meliorists mandate we reconcile 
ourselves. If anything is clear about human nature, it is that 
this is not an accurate view of who we have been or what we 
are now, or a view that should determine what we become.
Carl Elliott’s Viewpoint: Pharma’s Gain May Be 
Our Loss
Those of us who worry about medical enhancement are 
usually less worried about the technologies themselves 
than about the larger social effects of embracing them too 
enthusiastically. Just as you do not need to object to cars 
to worry about urban sprawl, you do not need to object 
to enhancement technologies to question where these 
technologies may be taking us. It is not just technophobes 
who wonder whether a society that consumes 90% of the 
world’s supply of methylphenidate (Ritalin), where the 
most proﬁ  table class of drugs is antidepressants, and where 
cosmetic surgeons perform liposuction on prime-time 
television is a society that has somehow lost its way.
Let’s look at three of the most commercially successful 
medical enhancements of recent years: selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors, hormone replacement therapy, and the 
diet drug fenﬂ  uramine-phentermine (Fen-Phen). What can 
we learn from these interventions?
First, the manufacturers of enhancement technologies 
will usually exploit the blurry line between enhancement 
and treatment in order to sell drugs. Because enhancement 
technologies must be prescribed by physicians, drug 
manufacturers typically market the technologies not as 
enhancements, but as treatments for newly discovered or 
under-recognized disorders. Selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors were marketed not as personality enhancers, 
or even only as treatments for clinical depression, but as 
treatments for questionable illnesses like “premenstrual 
dysphoric disorder” [16]. Fen-Phen was sold not as a mere 
diet drug but as a treatment for obesity, which Wyeth, the 
manufacturer, portrayed as a dangerous public health 
problem [17]. Estrogen replacement therapy was initially 
marketed as a risk-free way for women to extend their 
youthfulness. But when a 1974 study found that estrogen 
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replacement therapy was associated with an increased risk of 
endometrial cancer, the manufacturers added progesterone, 
renamed the combination “hormone” replacement therapy, 
and recast it as a treatment for medical problems associated 
with menopause such as osteoporosis [6].
Second, an alarming number of supposedly risk-free 
enhancements have later been associated with unanticipated 
side effects, some of them deadly. Wyeth has set aside over 
$16 billion to compensate the thousands of patients who have 
developed valvular heart disease and pulmonary hypertension 
after taking Fen-Phen [18]. A 2002 National Institutes of 
Health study found that hormone replacement therapy 
was associated with such an elevated risk of heart disease, 
stroke, pulmonary emboli, and breast cancer that the study 
was stopped prematurely [19]. Selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors are currently embroiled in controversy over whether 
they are associated with an elevated risk of suicide [20].
Third, the most successful enhancement technologies have 
been backed by tremendously inﬂ  uential public relations 
campaigns. These campaigns have included ghostwritten 
journal articles, industry-funded front groups, and lucrative 
payments to academics, professional societies, and university 
centers [21]. For example, GlaxoSmithKline marketed 
paroxetine (Paxil) by promoting the previously obscure 
diagnosis of “social anxiety disorder” through phony support 
groups, celebrity spokespeople, a direct-to-consumer illness 
awareness campaign, and generous payments to key opinion 
leaders [22]. The manufacturers of estrogen replacement 
therapy marketed the hormone in the 1960s by funding a 
“research foundation” for Robert Wilson, the gynecologist 
and author of the best-selling book Feminine Forever [6]. 
Wyeth marketed Fen-Phen by funding obesity research 
centers, launching public ﬁ  tness campaigns, contracting 
with a medical education company to produce a series of 
ghostwritten journal articles, and making generous payments 
to academic physicians who then published extensively 
and testiﬁ  ed for the drug’s safety to the Food and Drug 
Administration [17].
The traditional worry about enhancement technologies is 
that users of the technologies are buying individual well-being 
at the expense of some larger social good. I may improve my 
own athletic ability by taking steroids, but I set off a steroid 
arms race that destroys my sport. I may get cosmetic surgery 
for my “Asian eyes” or use skin lighteners for my dark skin, 
but I reinforce the implicitly racist social norms that say that 
Asian eyes or dark skin are traits to be ashamed of. The worry 
is that some aspect of the way we live together, collectively, is 
going to be damaged by actions that we take individually [4].
A market-driven health-care system brings this worry much 
closer to home. The pharmaceutical industry is now the most 
proﬁ  table and politically powerful industry in the United 
States [23]. It also has a huge ﬁ  nancial interest in creating a 
demand for enhancement technologies. The pharmaceutical 
industry can buy politicians to pass industry-friendly 
legislation; it can buy academic scientists to publish favorable 
journals articles; it can buy professional societies and patient 
support groups to spread the word on the newly medicalized 
disorders that its interventions are developed to treat [24]. It 
can even buy bioethicists to dispense with any moral concerns 
[25]. In this kind of political and economic climate, how 
likely is it that dissenting voices will have any effect before it is 
too late?
Caplan’s Response to Elliott’s Viewpoint
Elliott professes to be unhappy about enhancement. What 
arguments does he present to support his unhappiness? Not 
many, and the arguments that he does offer miss the point 
completely.
If people want to feel better, sleep less, have fewer hot 
ﬂ  ashes, better vision, or fewer wrinkles, then they may 
want to use enhancement technologies to achieve these 
things. Technology in itself isn’t driving us in any particular 
direction—I believe that we decide where it should go. Elliott, 
however, gravely warns us that you and I do not really decide 
a direction when it comes to matters of enhancement. It 
is—listen carefully for the Darth Vader–esque hissing—drug 
companies!
The rest of Elliott’s viewpoint amounts to what is his 
increasingly familiar harangue against the pharmaceutical 
industry. The drug companies sucker us into buying 
enhancement by getting us hooked on pseudotherapies. The 
drug companies rob us of our will to fend off their siren-like 
messages of better living through their chemistry. And the 
drug companies get us feeling so bad about ourselves that we 
empty our wallets on their latest overpriced geegaws.
Pharmaceutical companies may be evil incarnate. And 
we may be putty in their pecuniary little hands. But that has 
nothing at all to do with the question of whether there is 
anything wrong with pursuing enhancement. When Elliott 
eagerly dons his hair shirt to bemoan Big Pharma, he ﬁ  nds 
so much sin to revel in that he forgets to give a reason, any 
reason, why enhancement is, in itself, immoral.
At most he presents an argument for keeping the 
pharmaceutical industry out of enhancement. Okay, so 
let’s take Big Pharma out of the picture. If we left the 
encouragement of enhancement to the government, the 
military, schools, foundations, doctors, or parents, would this 
now be morally acceptable? I think sometimes it would be. And 
nothing that Elliott says provides any reason to think otherwise.
Elliott’s Response to Caplan’s Viewpoint
Caplan does not defend medical enhancement so much 
as attack its critics. Or rather, he attacks a small group of 
conservative critics who want to preserve “human nature.” 
He dispatches those critics with admirable precision, but I 
am not sure why he believes that group of critics includes 
me. My worry about enhancement technologies has little 
to do with human nature. My worry is that we will ignore 
important human needs at the expense of frivolous human 
desires; that dominant social norms will crowd out those of 
the minority; that the self-improvement agenda will be set not 
by individuals, but by powerful corporate interests; and that 
in the pursuit of betterment, we will actually make ourselves 
worse off. 
It’s no secret that many Americans are deeply ashamed 
of their personal shortcomings and inadequacies. Nor is it 
any secret that these shortcomings and inadequacies can be 
exploited for commercial proﬁ  t. But do we really want to 
submit our health-care system to the same forces that have 
made millionaires out of motivational speakers and diet book 
authors?
Skepticism about enhancement technologies is not 
equivalent to a wish to set back medical research and 
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declare some applications off-limits. This is a debate about 
enhancing human traits, not curing human illness. To say 
that our medical research agenda will be set back if we 
restrict enhancement technologies makes no more sense than 
saying that cancer surgery will be set back if the American 
Broadcasting Corporation cancels its cosmetic surgery reality 
TV show Extreme Makeover.
We live in a country where 46 million uninsured people 
cannot get basic medical care, while the rest of us spend a 
billion dollars a year on baldness remedies. It is not just the 
inequity here that is so impressive. It is the fact that we have 
gotten so accustomed to the inequity that we do not see it as 
obscene.
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